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A RESPONSE FROM THE VISITOR FROM 
ANOTHER PLANET 
J. Cun yon Gordon* 
On Monday, August 31, 1992, I clutched a podium in front of a 
hundred young people assembled in a semicircular room. Knowing 
they had come to judge me, I felt anxious, even though I had survived 
ordeals before. I had waited expectantly as a trial judge said, "Will 
the accused please rise" to a client accused of murder. I had stood 
before appellate judges imploring them to protect my teenaged client's 
right to confront his accusers. I had leaned into the dismissive face of 
a U.S. district court judge arguing that the Army did not have the 
right to discharge a decorated soldier who said he was gay. Then why, 
on that August day, did my blouse cling uncomfortably to my back as 
rivulets of sweat ran down, leaving me clammy and stuck together? 
Because these were no ordinary judges. 
In front of me, in the wings to my left and right, and (could it be?) 
above and behind me sat second- and third-year law students, jaded 
consumers, clearly asking themselves, "Okay, where's the real profes-
sor?" I forced myself to swallow and spoke, introducing myself as a 
"visiting professor." A troublemaker broke through the silence and 
rasped, "From where?" I paused, thinking of the law firm partnership 
I had just jeopardized for a year's leave of absence and how alien it 
seemed from this classroom full of quizzical faces. I wished I could 
say "Stanford," or "Iowa," or "Wayne State," and swaddle myself in 
familiar legitimacy. At long last I stuttered, "From another planet." 
"Oh. A real lawyer for a change," beamed my erstwhile tormentor. 
Even over the rustle of readjusting seats, the students could hear the 
relieved puff of breath I let escape. Ice broken, melting, we began a 
discourse on the history, purpose, and armament of the nation's crimi-
nal justice systems, setting a tone of rigorous, challenging, "down and 
dirty" grappling that would carry us safely through a semester of 
criminal procedure. The seventy minutes passed too quickly. After-
wards, I had to be peeled off the floor, rehydrated, and unkinked. 
I had come to the main phase of a journey from my home planet, 
law practice, to academia. Had I not believed an interrelationship ex-
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isted between them, I would not have stood there that airless after-
noon. Over the previous ten months, however, I had navigated a 
miasma of mistrust and misperception. Many academics seemed to 
accord little value to my skills and experiences collected in eleven 
years of practice. Likewise, my firm, although it had graciously 
granted my leave of absence, may have considered my year in 
academia a less than bullish investment in its bottom line. The warm 
reception from my students, however, belied any sense of disconnec-
tion. With these contradictions fresh in mind, I read Judge Edwards' 
article, I expecting him to examine and dispel my own concerned con-
fusion. He did not. 
On the one hand, Judge Edwards' description of the landscape of 
law practice reverberates with ugly truths that coincide with my expe-
rience and observations: the legal profession is in One Helluva State. 
On the other hand, the culprit he blames for this ugliness, ranging 
from unethical practice2 to lawyers' inability to write cogent briefs,3 is 
the growing influence of "outsider" scholars.4 How can Edwards so 
neatly pinpoint the scourges of practice and be so wrong about the 
relevant etiology? It was one of those things, as recording artists 
C + C Music Factory say, "that make you go 'hmmm ... .' " 5 After 
reflecting even more on the matters that preoccupied me during the 
past months, I concluded that, although Edwards cares no less deeply 
than I do about these issues, we approach them from opposite direc-
tions and see through different lenses. 6 Through his one-dimensional 
lenses Edwards identifies the primary infections of law practice as a 
lack of ethics, diminishing practical capability, and too little commit-
ment to public service. 7 Through my 3-D glasses I see the same un-
1. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Pro-
fession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992). 
2. " '[P]ractical' scholars ... are much better suited to teach law students what ethical prac-
tice means [whereas the theorists] •.. will be disadvantaged - 'in the effort to inculcate moral 
standards applicable to professional thinking and conduct in public roles.' " Id. at 74 (quoting 
Paul D. Carrington, Butterfly Effects: The Possibilities of Law Teaching in a Democracy, 41 
DUKE L.J. 741, 791 (1992)). 
3. Edwards, supra note 1, at 63-65. The "lack of depth and precision in legal analysis ••• 
[and inability] to focus an argument ... are attributable in no small measure to failings in 'doctri-
nal education.'" Id. at 64-65. 
4. Id. at 34-37. Edwards labels the "law and" and critical legal studies movements "imprac-
tical.'' I call "Crits" and "law ands" the "outsiders.'' Outsiders are those "whose marginality 
defines the boundaries of the mainstream.'' Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and 
Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2412 (1989). 
5. c + c MUSIC FACTORY, Things That Make You Go Hmmm ..• .• on GONNA MAKE You 
SWEAT (Columbia Records 1990). 
6. A lens is the partiality with which one examines and attempts to make sense of the world; 
it both shapes and reflects the way we understand it. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 4, at 2413. 
7. Edwards keeps good company when he criticizes the failure of the bar to donate its time. 
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healthy influences, but I see them surrounded by life-threatening and 
systemic problems of racism, sexism, and elitism. 
Our very different lenses also determine what we discern as the 
causes. Down the tunnel of his vision, Judge Edwards sees a cabal of 
"impractical" scholars whose disdain for practice propels the academy 
away from practice, elite law schools that give them a bully pulpit, and 
prestigious legal journals that publish their tracts. 8 Yet, from that di-
rection I feel a waft of fresh air from the voices only beginning to have 
influence. Where he sees a disjunction, I see a conjunction. His para-
digm of a disjunction serves an unfortunately divisive function: it aids 
and comforts those who would stanch change, who defend the tradi-
tional canon against outsiders.9 It fuels their engines. 
In order to admit, as I do, that the related planets of practice and 
academia are conjoined, one has to realize, as I have, that the legacy of 
the heavily doctrinal education Edwards wants to preserve may be 
precisely the lawyers he upbraids - lawyers who generally do not live, 
work, and behave ethically (with fairness, compassion, and creativity) 
in a complex, heterogeneous society. This recognition in tum compels 
the conclusion I reach that the outsiders - with their challenges to 
the status quo's values, their upstart theories and innovative pedago-
gies, and even their Star Trek-and-the-law scholarship - may help 
save Planet Practice. 
I do not deny a personal stake in this debate. As a black woman 
practitioner scoping out academia, I have one foot in each world. Yet 
I am an outsider in both. Because a widening "gap" between them 
would be detrimental to my corpus, they had better be so close that an 
itch in one can be scratched in the other. 
Taking the lead from Edwards' use of anecdotal material - does 
he call it "narrative"? - I will share the insights gained during my 
year as the visitor from another planet10 and respond to the judge's 
propositions en route. Part I is my view of "unethical practices"; Part 
Hardly a month goes by these days when the ABA does not devote space to the need for pro 
bono work. See J. Michael Mc Williams, Making Time For Pro Bono, ABA J., Apr. 1993, at 8; J. 
Michael McWilliams, Standing Up For The Powerless, ABA J., Feb. 1993, at 8. This year the 
ABA House of Delegates adopted a rule that urges lawyers to perform 50 hours of pro bono 
work a year. 
8. Edwards, supra note 1, at 46. 
9. This perennial debate resurfaced in the 1980s with ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE 
AMERICAN MIND: How HIGHER EDUCATION HAS FAILED DEMOCRACY AND IMPOVERISHED 
THE SOULS OF TODAY'S STUDENTS (1987); see also DINESH D'SOUZA, ILLIBERAL EDUCATION 
(1991). For the flip side of the debate, see HENRY L. GATES, JR., LOOSE CANONS (1992); see 
also JULIUS GETMAN, IN THE COMPANY OF SCHOLARS 130-208 (1992). 
10. Inspiration for my metaphor comes from the film THE BROTHER FROM ANOTHER 
PLANET (A-Train Films 1984). An interplanetary traveler who happens to look like "any other 
Brother" arrives on earth and gets buffeted through misadventures because he has no idea of the 
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II, of scholarship; Part III, of teaching; and Part IV, of the outsiders' 
contribution. 
I. PLANET PRACTICE: A WIDER LANDSCAPE 
I don't think ladies should be lawyers. I believe you belong at home rais-
ing a family. 
- Cook County, Illinois judgell 
I guess they don't have many golf courses in the ghetto. 
- Baker & McKenzie partner12 
Edwards' catalogue of the woes of Planet Practice resonated so 
deeply that I thought he had stolen half my letters home. Aided by 
watchful former clerks, he spotted the greed, the dishonesty, the hol-
lowness of the luxurious surroundings, the "Bill or be Banished" 
blues, the selfishness. 13 In eleven years I had seen all of it, and more, 
on the landscape. But I believe "ethical" behavior means more than 
abiding by a code of professional responsibility; I believe racism and 
sexism 14 are unethical. 
You want unethical conduct? The quotes that opened this section 
are not isolated incidents in the lives of women and minority lawyers. 
Thirty-eight percent of female attorneys and twenty-two percent of 
male attorneys note differential treatment of male and female counsel 
by judges. 15 Women represent only twelve percent of federal judges and 
sixteen percent of lawyers who practice in the western U.S. courts. 16 In 
one megafirm a senior woman partner called a meeting of the women 
partners, prompting one male colleague to carp, "What if we held 
meetings of the men partners?" "You do," was the easy retort. 
"They're called Executive Committee meetings."17 Sometimes they 
''just don't get it." 
rules, but appears to understand them. Although I was "passing" for a scholar simply because I 
was teaching at a law school, I was far from it. 
11. Said to woman practitioner appearing before him in open court. Renee Cordes, Senate 
Panel To Consider Simon Bill Attacking Gender Bias in Courts, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., May 7, 
1991, at 3 (hereinafter Senate Panel). 
12. Said by partner to a black woman University of Chicago law student interviewing for 
associate position. B&M Apologizes for Racism, Fights Partner's Sex-Bias Suit, CRAIN's CHI. 
Bus., Oct. 26, 1992, at 21. 
13. Edwards, supra note 1, at 67 n.90, 68, 69 nn.95 & 96; see generally id. at 66-74. 
14. See Legal Sexism, NATL. L.J., Apr. 2, 1990, at 12; Unequal Partners, ABA J., Apr. 1993, 
at 50. 
15. James A. Knecht, Only You Can End Gender Bias: Justice, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Apr. 
29, 1992, at 6. 
16. Harriet Chiang, Sex Harassment Reported in Courts, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 5, 1992, at A3. 
17. Of Chicago's 25 largest firms, 9 have women in management committees; not one had a 
woman as managing partner. Mary Lou Song, Women Note Visible Victories but Slow Gains, 
CHI. LAW., June 1992, at 8-11. 
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Only 3.3% of the nation's 777,000-plus lawyers are black. Of 
these, thirty-one percent are in law firms - one-half the majority 
rate. 18 Before I ventured away from the Planet Practice in 1992, I 
could convene a meeting of my firm's black partners in a single stall in 
the women's room, with no standees. That heartsunk. feeling that all 
outsiders know sooner or later came at my first partners' meeting in 
January 1991. Row after row of beige heads perched atop dark blue 
and grey shoulders, interrupted by the glint of a brightly colored scarf 
or a gilt barrette, made a nightmarish scene, live and in one living 
color. It is hard to go back in there after that. 
Yet, I have lived there and felt the painful sting of "-isms" that left 
me asking if my skin is too thin. In one state courtroom, a prominent 
sign propped on the podium instructed, "ALL NON-ATTORNEY 
PERSONNEL MUST IDENTIFY THEMSELVES AS SUCH 
WHEN APPROACHING THE BENCH." Often law firms sent 
paralegals or docket clerks to enter uncontested orders. One morning 
my opposing counsel and I stepped up to the bench to argue a proce-
dural motion. He stated his name, I stated mine, and the judge 
squinted and asked, "Miss, who is the attorney on the case?" My face 
went white-hot as I stood there stewing in my expensive suit of armor. 
Wrestling back the words, "Why, Yo' honah. Jes' little ol' me," cre-
ated a bilious knot in my gut. Fortunately, a keen instinct for survival 
pushed out a simple "I am, Your Honor." The sniggles from the 
courtroom stung like nettles. I made excuses for him. Maybe I looked 
too young to be a great big important lawyer; maybe I looked lost; 
maybe . . . . I never introduced myself in court again without the title 
"Attorney" before my name and the name of my law firm after it. 
Otherwise I am invisible. 
Survey after survey depicts how the practice of law has become a 
virtual jungle of sexism, 19 racism, and "playing hardball."20 Yet, 
Judge Edwards ignores them in a tract devoted to exposing and trying 
to resolve problems in law practice and education. Do these plagues 
- which are as widespread and destructive as bill padding and lying 
to opponents, if not more - deserve no mention? 
That the unethical treatment of women, minorities, and minority 
18. THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION, AMERICAN BAR AssOCIA-
TION, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT- AN EDUCATIONAL CONTIN-
UUM (1992) 25, 26 (hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT). 
19. At least 30 states joined in recommending judicial education as a means of fighting dis-
crimination against women, causing Senator Paul Simon to introduce the Equal Justice for Wo-
men in the Courts Act of 1991. See Senate Panel, supra note 11, at 3. 
20. Andrew Grene,Civility Panel Considers Detention for Rude Lawyers, CHI. DAILY L. 
BULL., Apr. 8, 1993, at 1. 
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women is invisible or unimportant to such a keen and concerned ob-
server of the profession tells me that I cannot trust that his flawed 
vision has not also skewed his evaluation of who the culprits are in the 
academy. No, it does not matter that Edwards' article was not on 
"race" or "woman trouble." He limits what he perceives in law prac-
tice to a vision that will sustain his purpose, the defense of the acad-
emy's traditional canon. Surely if "outsider" exclusion in the 
profession is part of the problem, then the emergence of outsiders in 
the academy could be the solution. When I start with these pandemic 
problems, it is not hard to trace them back to a resistant strain in the 
traditional academy. 
II. DISDAIN FOR PRACTICE: PHASE ONE OF THE JOURNEY 
Given Judge Edwards' and my picture of the practice landscape, it 
is small wonder that Edwards believes that academics hold its inhabit-
ants in contempt for their base desires and baseless activity. A profes-
sor who feels disdain probably conveys that to her students, whether 
its object is practice or the plight of others. Edwards to the contrary, 
outsiders have no monopoly on arrogance or disdain. Indeed, I ven-
ture to say, they have not even a toehold in the market. Julius 
Getman thus describes his own decision to teach: 
[T]he basic decision not to enter the field for which I was trained is one 
made by everyone who chooses teaching over a professional career. We 
reject the lives we are preparing our students to live. Embedded in this 
simple fact is an awful irony. We se(,!k meaning by preparing students 
for a life we do not find meaningfu1.21 
All academics, not only those whose scholarship tends toward the 
more theoretical, should challenge themselves to confront that irony. 
Given that outsiders still make up a minority of professors, and given 
Edwards' own data that a mere quarter of law professors have more 
than five years' practice experience,22 a great many traditionalists lack 
the long-term commitment to and understanding of practice that Ed-
wards finds so crucial, and they perforce reveal their antipractice bias 
in class. 
The cause for the disdain matters more than simply whether it ex-
ists. If the professoriate's disdain comes from perceiving practitioners 
21. GETMAN, supra note 9, at 14. 
22. Robert J. Borthwick & Jordan R. Schau, Note, Gatekeepers of the Profession: An Empiri-
cal Profile of the Nation's Law Professors, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 191, 219 (1991), quoted in 
Edwards, supra note 1, at 50 n.48. From my review of the faculty biographies at my host school, 
the trend was to practice briefly, then reject it for the higher intellectual ground of academia. 
The self-righteousness that comes from suffering doubtless adds to the sense of superiority. I was 
delighted to find that the less traditional faculty members were the ones who actively mix with 
the "real world" and its problems. 
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as crass, dishonest materialists, the academy should struggle mightily 
to instill better values in students, most of whom become practitioners. 
More emphasis on building a sense of community, shared values, and 
respect for others' dignity would go far toward ending these negative 
behaviors. Oh, I am sorry; those are the outsiders' themes.23 On the 
other hand, disdain for the perceived intellectual vacuity of practice 
may be every academic's occupational hazard.24 Most of the acad-
emy's disdain for practice comes from the sheer arrogance of the 
scholarship enterprise that motivates most legal academic institutions. 
I would lay odds that the academic law of survival - publish or per-
ish - was not coined by Crits. 
My introduction to academia illustrates the focus and the cause of 
the disdain. In August 1991, I registered for a symposium for minor-
ity legal scholars and sent my resume, which reflects substantial trial 
and appellate litigation experience in criminal and civil law, liberal 
public service, and pro bono advocacy. It also reveals that I had never 
published a law review article. The resume caught the eye of law 
school bounty hunters and gatherers,25 who told me about their cur-
ricula, collegiality, and visions for the future. I heard no inkling of a 
"Judge Edwards problem," that is, that practitioners had little to offer 
academia or that I was contemptible. In fact, the hunters tooted about 
my background and praised my ascension to partnership in a major 
law firm. They knew that a show of conteµipt was no way to bag a 
minority.26 Seduced as I was by this show of respect for "real lawyer-
ing," I completely forgot my long-held opinion that academics are 
self-important, intellectual snobs. As a result, I was totally unpre-
pared for the reality jolt I got at one school. 
After a morning round of so-what-got-you-interested-in-teaching 
interviews with designated faculty members, I was hopeful that I had 
landed in a hospitable place to teach, learn, and ponder a transition to 
academia. In the early afternoon, I presented a talk to the faculty that 
seemed to be well-received. I had no "work in progress," the usual 
23. "[S]torytelling focus[ es] on .•. community-building ... consensus, a common culture of 
shared understandings, and deeper, more vital ethics." Delgado, supra note 4, at 2414. 
24. Academics look down their noses at practitioners the w_ay practitioners look down their 
noses at academics. The expression, "Those who can, do. Those who can't, teach,'' was not born 
of mutual respect. 
25. Whether they had formal affirmative action policies or not, they were trawling for minor-
ities. At the time, I put aside where I stood on the debate, gift horses being what they are. 
Compare Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal Academia, 
1990 DUKE L.J. 705 with STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
BABY (1991). 
26. At the time I interviewed, my host school had a black full professor, who was scheduled 
to visit away in academic year 1992-1993 and a Hispanic associate prqfessor (both males). 
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presentation. My job talk was on an issue I was researching for clients 
I represented who were suffering alleged AIDS discrimination. The 
afterglow wore off when I was blind-sided by a Rambo-scholar who 
thrust himself in front of me in what animal behaviorists must call the 
"attack posture" and barked, "So what're you writing about?" 
Hackles fully up, defensive, I sneered, "I have been practicing law, not 
writing about it." Fortunately, a twenty-five-year veteran of the "aca-
demic game" heard this gaucherie, dragged me aside by the scruff, and 
threatened to circumcise me if I ever said that again. Waggling a fin-
ger in my face, my rescuer said, "Repeat after me: 'I HAVE A 
BURNING DESIRE TO WRITE. SCHOLARSHIP IS MY PAS-
SION, AND THAT IS WHY I AM HERE. PRACTICE DOES 
NOT PROVIDE ME THE INTELLECTUAL RIGOR OR SATIS-
FACTION I SO DESPERATELY WANT. IT IS A VERITABLE 
WASTELAND.' Got it?" Got it. Chanted it like a mantra at suc-
ceeding interviews and even through dinner. Still do. This near-miss 
confirmed two truths: scholarship, not teaching, is the be-all and end-
all in academia, the coin of the realm;27 and scholars, even traditional 
ones, consider law practice the province of the brain dead. 
Although this "publish, publish, publish" carries the same malig-
nant germ as the "money, money, money" that Edwards lambasted, I 
am not deterred from seeking my scholarly muse. One outsider-
turned-insider urges new academics to "write about what you genu-
inely believe rather than ... about what you are told ... you ought to 
address."28 I try to remain undaunted by the question of what schol-
arship is. Is it "essentially the restatement of other people's thinking," 
or is it writing that "involves a debate within the academy?"29 Of this 
I am sure: while the academy battles over what constitutes "real" 
scholarship, it seems clear that traditional academics only want to see 
a certain kind, and only they can produce it. 30 
Ill. PHASE Two OF THE JOURNEY: THE PEDAGOGY OF 
THE OPPRESSED 
Judge Edwards accurately perceives that the pedagogical dilemma 
is how to develop a teaching method that is at once theoretical, doctri-
nal, and practical. I disagree with him as to how that pedagogy could 
27. A law review survey that one school circulated quite proudly ranks schools by pages 
published per faculty member in twenty leading journals! Note, Chicago-Kent Law Review 
Faculty Scholarship Survey, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 509, 521 (1990). 
28. Aviam Soifer, MuSings, 37 J. LEGAL Eouc. 20, 22 (1987). 
29. GETMAN, supra note 9, at 44. 
30. See GATES, supra note 9, at 33. 
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be improved, but I applaud his concern. The fact that he worries at all 
about teaching sets him apart from many academics.31 I thought I 
understood the concept of academic freedom, but to my surprise my 
host school was blissfully aloof about the content and manner of my 
teaching. I took this to be more evidence that academia was another 
planet. Imagine a partner telling an associate, "Oh, go on and handle 
that antitrust matter any way you'd like .... " 
Teaching itself is so difficult; I wanted badly to do it well. When 
done well, it "[makes] students feel capable" and gives them an ele-
vated sense of potential. 32 I wanted myself and them to accomplish 
feats of academic brilliance in class, but I also wanted to leave them 
feeling good and capable, rather than simply to "train" them to be 
"useful." I also realized that education, the great equalizer, can foster 
elitism. I join Professor Getman in condemning legal education for 
its arrogant assumption of intellectual superiority; its social, intellectual, 
and professional rating systems; its limited focus; its overemphasis on 
professional competence; [and] its failure to provide an opportunity to 
express other aspects of our intellectual ability, such as creativity, empa-
thy, and understanding .... 33 
The overemphasis on "pure doctrine," when combined with tradi-
tional pedagogical methods, instills an intellectual arrogance that stu-
dents blithely take with them, whether to practice or back to 
academia. Edwards hectors the outsiders for "abstract" scholarship, 
detachment, and incapacity to "integrate the 'academic' with the 
'practical.' "34 Objection, Your Honor. The outsiders offer a version 
of the law not "divorced from reality" as Edwards claims, but hyper-
real. They bring in more reality, certainly more of a certain kind of 
reality, than traditionalists like Edwards can abide, but it is that ingre-
dient that Getman laments was left out of his own education. As a 
result, these outsiders do pose a clear and present danger to the tyr-
anny of "neutrality" in the canon. Feminist legal theorists35 cut right 
to the nuggets, challenging the androcentric, individualistic values 
they see undergirding traditional interpretations of legal doctrine. 36 
31. "Publishing articles .•• has greater payoffs than teaching in terms of prestige, raises, job 
offers, and promotions ..•. [W]e seem to have developed a whole new culture of young academ-
ics ... determined to research, write, and publish while they incidentally meet with ... classes." 
GETMAN, supra note 9, at 40. 
32. Id. at 17. 
33. Id. at 13. 
34. Edwards, supra note 1, at 42. 
35. See, e.g., FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY (Katharine T. Bartlett & Roseanne Kennedy eds., 
1991); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987). 
36. See, e.g., Mary I. Coombs, Shared Privacy and The Fourth Amendment, or The Rights of 
Relationships, 15 CAL. L. REV. 1593 (1987). Professor Coombs draws on feminist legal theory to 
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The narrative scholars invite us to empathize by hearing the stories of 
marginalized "others."37 Critical race theorists chip away at the per-
ceived neutral principles of law, exposing how they reflect the hegem-
ony of nonneutral values and wreak injustice upon certain 
disempowered people.38 The motley crew of "law ands," (can't live 
with 'em, can't shoot 'em) import their interdisciplinary arts and sci-
ences and make us realize that law is not insulated from the rest of 
society. All told, I learned the most about teaching from folks who 
want to shake up the academy a little. At their best, their contribu-
tions will affect not only what students learn in law school, but the 
manner in which they learn, and they will leave an indelible mark on 
those students. 
Professor Andrew Taslitz suggested teaching goals that smacked 
of outsider influence: 1) integrate theory and practice the way practi-
tioners do; 2) expand the ways in which students learn by doing; 3) 
make an "art" out of lawyering by understanding the theories of ap-
pellate cases; and 4) use tools of other disciplines. 39 To accomplish 
Goal Three, I immersed myself in pertinent scholarship. Contrary to 
Edwards' lament, 40 the journals brimmed with heavily doctrinal schol-
arship. There were scholarly surveys of law41 and critical analyses of 
relevant doctrinal developments, by both scholars42 and students, 43 
although the outsiders contributed to the discourse.44 
emphasize the role that human interconnectedness should play in the courts' treatment of issues 
such as standing and consent in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
37. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RA-
CIAL JUSTICE (1987). 
38. See, e.g., Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Toward a Black Legal Scholarship: Race and Original 
Understandings, 1991 DUKE L.J. 39, 80-82. 
39. Andrew E. Taslitz, Exorcising Langdell's Ghost: Structuring a Criminal Procedure 
Casebook for How Lawyers Really Think, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 143 (1991). I do not suggest that 
Taslitz' goals were revelatory. In fact, their appeal was their common sense. When the school's 
"usual suspects," who encouraged and supported my learning endeavor, offered similar advice, I 
knew Taslitz was on the money. Thanks. See also Myron Moskovitz, Beyond the Case Method: 
It's Time To Teach with Problems, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 241 (1992). 
40. Edwards, supra note 1, at 42-43. 
41. The Georgetown Law Journal publishes an annual survey of criminal procedure that I 
found invaluable in preparing for my course. E.g., Project, Twenty-First Annual Review of Crimi-
nal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Court of Appeals 1990-1991, 80 GEO. L.J. 939 
(1992). 
42. See, for example, Tracey Maclin, Justice Thurgood Marshall: Taking the Fourth Amend-
ment Seriously, 11 CORNELL L. REV. 723 (1992), which became my bedrock for Fourth Amend-
ment theory and doctrine. · 
43. See, e.g., Doyle J. Baker, Note, Sobriety Checkpoints: Michigan Department of State v. 
Sitz, 39 KAN. L. REv., at 111 (1991). 
44. See, e.g., Ian C. Weiner, Note, Running Rampant: The Imposition of Sanctions and the 
Use of Force Against Fleeing Criminal Suspects, 80 GEO. L.J. 2175 (1992) (applying a law-and-
economics (!) analysis to Fourth Amendment violations). 
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Goal One was served admirably by my text selection, the old 
Kamisar, LaFave and Israel45 standard freshened up. Along with 
that, a chronicle of three years in the Manhattan District Attorney's 
office46 provided an ingredient Judge Edwards should like: dirty real-
ism. I especially urged those who believed they would spend their 
early professional years arguing weighty constitutional issues to read 
carefully about prosecuting subway "token suckers."47 I said dirty re-
alism. For Goal Two, Taslitz recommended an innovative criminal 
procedure text that teaches almost exclusively with problems. 48 I 
wanted to use problems in class, but neophytes should steer wide of 
new texts; we need to call on veteran users in emergencies. So my 
research assistant and I devised some problems, set them in local 
neighborhoods, and used incidents that were as often "ripped from 
today's headlines" as from reruns of Miami Vice and Dragnet. 
Although I tried not to shrink from tough issues of race, class, or sex, 
I confess that in order to "raise consciousness" I created "neutral" 
villains who had committed insurance fraud or insider trading rather 
than subway muggings. 
Because I believe, along with Edwards, that professors should 
avoid divorcing doctrine from the reality that purports to inform it, I 
hope he would not object to my method of introducing reality. One 
kind of reality is political. Edwards cringed at the notion that an aca-
demic might express skepticism about the fairness of federal courts in 
a class.49 I say two words in response: Clarence Thomas. The bla-
tantly partisan political squabbling that attended his nomination and 
confirmation removed any lingering doubt that the federal bench is not 
deeply politicized. 
Another kind of reality is that which comes from understanding 
and empathizing with the day-to-day reality that never comes across 
in dry appellate opinions. Do students think that Supreme Court Jus-
tices travel much by interstate bus? Or that Justice O'Connor has ever 
been approached sitting on the back seat of one by armed police of-
ficers and asked for identification?50 I don't think so. The Court often 
45. YALE KAMISAR ET AL., BASIC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (7th ed. 1990 & Supp. 1992). 
The text's severe editing of reported cases is redeemed by abundant references to historical mate-
rial, original source studies from other disciplines, and scholarly treatments of a number of crimi-
nal procedure issues. 
46. DAVID HEILBRONER, ROUGH JUSTICE: DAYS AND NIGHTS OF A YOUNG D.A. (1990). 
47. Id at 12-13. 
48. WELSH S. WHITE & JAMES J. TOMKOVICZ, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CoNsrITUTIONAL 
CoNSTRAINTS UPON INVESTIGATION AND PROOF (1990), discussed in Taslitz, supra note 39, at 
150-63. 
49. Edwards, supra note 1, at 61. 
50. Justice O'Connor authored Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991). The Court held 
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benefited from a story from Justice Thurgood Marshall (maybe the 
original narrative scholar). Similarly, a student trying to understand 
the Court's attempts to balance the rights of suspects against the obli-
gation of police to keep communities safe in accordance with constitu-
tional principles can benefit from dirty realism. Edwards should 
therefore not urge professors to teach antiseptically. I would no 
sooner teach criminal procedure doctrines and theory "wholly di-
vorced" from the reality of race, class, power, and even partisan poli-
tics51 than Edwards would teach law and economics "wholly 
divorced" from cases. Pretending that case law develop~ neutrally 
would be not only "impractical" but disingenuous. My kind of hon-
esty may lead to the classroom becoming a "battleground" for ideas, 
but pretense leads to the very result Judge Edwards wants to avoid -
lawyers unable to grapple with "hard" issues in practice. The impor-
tant caveat - and very tricky goal - is to use one's own opinions to 
advance the debate rather than to end it. 
Yet another kind of shared reality comes from using tools that 
concretize what students are learning.52 For instance, arrest reports, 
search warrants, and Miranda53 waiver forms can make students "see, 
feel, and smell" living, breathing 3-D doctrine. Visuals have a way of 
illuminating and demystifying the law's nuances and obscurity. For 
instance, the tension in Fifth Amendment doctrine and confessions 
may be conveyed better by a videotape of a district attorney's interro-
gation of a woman suspected of committing murder by arson;54 a 
dramatization of a confession obtained by trickery;55 or a TV version 
of a coerced Miranda waiver.56 One reason criminal procedure fasci-
nates me is the players involved, people who never quite materialize in 
that no Fourth Amendment seizure occurred "[s]o long as the reasonable person would feel free 
'to disregard the police and go about his business.'" 111 S. Ct. at 2386 (quoting California v. 
Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1S47, 1SS2 (1991)). It applied that standard to the petitioner, a black male 
in his twenties, finding that he was "free to leave" the encounter between him and the police in 
the back of a bus bound from Miami to Atlanta. 111 S. Ct. at 2386-87. It is folly for a law 
professor to fail to point out that the doctrine of the "reasonable person,'' wholly divorced from 
reality, may not apply to poor black males. 
SL Who can ignore the Rehnquist Court's full assault on the Bill of Rights in service to a 
politically conservative agenda? During the 1990 and 1991 Terms, the Court rejected defend-
ants' Fourth Amendment claims that had been upheld by state courts or lower federal courts in 
the vast majority of criminal cases it heard. Maclin, supra note 42, at 728 n.lS; see also Steven 
Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging "Drug Exception" to The Bill of Rights, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 
889 (1987). 
52. See Taslitz, supra note 39, at 144. 
53. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), held that police must advise a suspect in cus-
tody of certain rights before beginning to interrogate the suspect. 
54. See People v. Vese, 417 N.Y.S.2d 1015 (1979). 
SS. See Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 598 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 989 (1986). 
56. Homicide: Confession Is Good for the Soul (NBC television broadcast, Mar. 3, 1993). 
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the case law or academic theories. Few in my class had ever had more 
than a casual encounter with the police. As a result, when we grap-
pled with the doctrines concerning constraining police behavior, we 
invited a cop to class. A veteran of Boston's finest guest-lectured and 
favored the class with a terrifying demonstration of a "stop and frisk." 
Although Terry v. Ohio clearly describes the frisk, 57 when this beefy 
plainclothes officer kicked the student volunteer's legs apart and 
groped him roughly from shoulder to butt to groin to ankle, the class 
recoiled. Especially those who could see a 9mm pistol in his waist-
band. (The cop's, not the student's.) No young prosecutor or de-
fender should enter a courtroom with a sterile or romanticized notion 
of how the Fourth Amendment "constrains" a citizen's encounter 
with the police. While Edwards focuses primarily on exposing stu-
dents to the reality of practice, I would emphasize the reality of real-
ity. Importantly for this debate, one need not have practiced law to 
gain insights into, or to convey to students the value of, the enterprise 
they will enter. 
I believe Edwards would agree that I can and should integrate the-
ory, doctrine, and realism in this way, as long as I first instill a healthy 
respect for "real" doctrine. I am not so sure that I want to do that. I 
really did want my students to develop a suspicion of power and of 
those who seek to use the law to corral power at the expense of the 
weaker. I wanted students to question those who claim that the tradi-
tional view is "objective" or "real" simply because it survives un-
criticized. Thus armed, I expect them to go out into Planet Practice 
and challenge judges and other practitioners to put on new lenses, or 
at least to acknowledge they are wearing lenses already. I expect their 
exposure to reality to cause them to respect their colleagues, to care 
about their stories, and to behave "ethically" toward them. 
IV. ALIGNING THE PLANETS 
Modifying the substance of what students learn in law schools will 
only partially cure Planet Practice. I learned that how I taught was 
just as important as what I would teach. 58 I read articles on the new 
57. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. l, 16-17 & n.13 (1968). Terry held that a law enforcement officer 
can intrude briefly on an individual's liberty in order to dispel an articulable suspicion that the 
individual is engaged in or has engaged in criminal conduct, question the person, and "frisk" him 
for weapons. 
58. The outsiders' nontraditional approaches to substance and method inure to the benefit of 
the profession. Students should learn "legal language and interpretation," Edwards, supra note 
1, at 61, and to "use cases," but also the ethics of mutual respect and inclusion. 
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pedagogy59 and attended the 1992 Workshop of New Law Teachers 
sponsored by the Association of American Law Schools, one of the 
organizations Edwards blames for its role in "opening up" the acad-
emy. As a result, I rejected Professor Kingsfield60 as a role model and 
chose to conduct both my large class and my spring seminar in an 
"interactive" feminist pedagogical mode. Instead of the stand-up-and-
be-humiliated style of pseudo-Socratic method, I relied heavily on vol-
unteers willing to work to argue doctrine, theory, and policy with 
themselves and their classmates. We struggled to harmonize inconsis-
tent precedent and understand reversals in trends, and we excoriated 
the Court when it revealed that it was "clueless" about the real world. 
Once (or twice) we were downright cynical. 
When we create a community in the class in which all voices are 
given an opportunity to be heard and exchange is robust and deep but 
not vicious, everyone leaves feeling "capable, with an elevated sense of 
potential."61 Every time a woman is encouraged to speak out in a law 
school class, and a man waits his tum while listening to her, another 
nail goes in sexism's coffin. When women talk, we may have to lean to 
hear their "small, soft voices, often courageously trying to speak 
up."62 Some of the invisibility6J that women and minorities suffer in 
Planet Practice starts in "Kingsfield" classes. There, the white male 
student, who spars with the white male professor for the majority of 
the class period and survives, learns that he can survive. On the other 
hand, when students of color and women are "spared" that exercise, 64 
the opposite message is conveyed to all students: you, my younger 
self, are being transformed "into one worthy of mingling with the 
country's professional, intellectual, political, and social elite."65 And 
you, invisibles, are not. To be fair, I must tell you that one white 
59. E.g., Becky Thompson & Estelle Disch, Feminist, Anti-Racist, Anti-Oppression Teaching, 
41 RADICAL TCHR. 4 (1992). 
60. Professor Kingsfield is the venerable contracts professor of JOHN JAY OSBORN, THE PA-
PER CHASE (1971). He was brought to memorable life by John Houseman in the 1973 epony-
mous movie THE PAPER CHASE (Twentieth Century-Fox 1973). Unfortunately, for many law 
students, Kingsfield is the paradigm of a law professor. Students may resist non-Kingsfields. 
See, e.g., PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991). 
61. See supra text accompanying note 32. 
62. ADRIENNE RICH, Taking Women Students Seriously, in ON LIES, SECRETS, AND SI-
LENCE 237, 243 (1979). 
63. See Kim A. Taylor, Invisible Woman: Reflections on the Clarence Thomas Confirmation 
Hearing, 45 STAN. L. REV. 55 (1992). 
64. Susan Faludi describes Allan Bloom's puzzlement at the reaction of women students to 
his excluding them. He explained that some of them "actually got mad because he didn't call on 
them during the question and answer period." SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED 
WAR AGAINST AMERICAN WOMEN 294 (1991). 
65. Getman, supra note 9, at 10. 
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student in my large class said he perceived that I was "harder" in class 
on white men than on others. His remark reminded me of the news 
accounts of the debate on the military's ban on gays, in which straight 
military men vocally object to having openly gay men as shipmates 
and say that the gay men will prey upon them. Suddenly when the 
"object" shoe is on the other foot, these men understand in a deeply 
personal way the deleterious effect of unwanted, even if imagined, sex-
ual attention. Got it? Keep it. When the chosen ones who survived 
Kingsfield go to the Planet, they take with them the feeling of power 
and superiority they get from being clones. Clones graduate to be-
come the associates, partners, and judges who think women should be 
at home, who sexually harass their colleagues, 66 and who rest comfort-
ably on statistics that confirm what they already believe about them-
selves. Some return to the scene of the crime to perpetuate the same 
fraud on the next generation of law students. Smart money says they 
do not become unfair, racist, sexist, unethical, or greedy by reading 
Toni Morrison67 in Family Law or Faulkner in Legal History or from 
studying Icelandic tribes. 
When Edwards skewers the outsiders who tell stories or write 
about economics or philosophy, he wholly ignores that they have done 
what he condemns practitioners for failing to do: elevated passion 
over the pursuit of filthy lucre. Moreover, until they really take over 
academia, many of them do more than merely forgo law firm loot for 
the scholar's slim purse. The. cost of disrupting the status quo may be 
the lost chance at tenure, even jobs in the first place, in the tightening 
academic market. They win the opprobrium of the mainstream plu-
tocracy. 68 Their existence alone under those conditions is a fine lesson 
for law students to learn, even if not one of them ever "uses" it in 
practice. 
I have gone on a while about how "practical" I found the work 
and themes of the outsiders. I have one fu:i.al pitch to make on their 
behalf. Their work may actually be practical in the more conventional 
66. For three recent cases involving sex discrimination claims brought by women attorneys 
against their employers, see Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984); Ezold v. Wolf, 
Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 751 F. Supp. 1175 (E.D. Pa. 1990), revd., 983 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 
1992); and Halbrook v. Reichhold Chem., Inc., 735 F. Supp. 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
67. Toni Morrison won the National Book Critics Award for SONG OF SOLOMON (1977) 
when I was in law school, although I believe there is no causal connection. I was so excited that 
I ran into the common room at school, with a Time magazine in my fist that had the goddess on 
the cover. I saw one of my white male classmates, whom I had mistaken for well educated, and 
exclaimed "Toni Morrison is on the cover of Time!" "Who is he?" my ex-friend asked, sincerely. 
Whack! Invisible. 
68. There is a developing cottage industry built Qn trashing the outsiders. See, e.g., Randall 
Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745 (1989); don't see 
Michael Weiss, Feminist Pedagogy in the Law Schools, ACAD. QUESTIONS, Summer 1992, at 75. 
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way Edwards uses it, as in "usable to judges or practitioners in resolv-
ing a particular problem." Not two weeks ago I participated in the 
annual judicial training of the judges for the Superior Court of the 
District of Columbia. This two-day program included sessions on sen-
tencing, judicial ethics, criminal discovery, and judicial involvement in 
child placements. Five real academics and I facilitated two-hour dis-
cussions with groups of judges, using fiction to help them understand 
their own profession. Everyone had prepared by reading two short 
stories: Billy Budd 69 and The Two. 10 Before long the judges were 
sharing personal stories about the ways prejudice can infect and affect 
judgment, the difference that one's culture makes in exercising judg-
ment, and even the effect of work issues on their families. Edwards 
might harrumph that such an exercise was a waste of the judges' and 
the professors' time. Even if the discussion does not in the strictest 
sense "aid the court's understanding of the doctrine" of responsibility 
or self-defense or provide a pithy quote for a judicial opinion (unless 
we get lucky), it is "practical" in the sense of adding value to the en-
terprises of all involved. Personally, I know that when I next appear 
before a trial or appellate judge, I will do so convinced that a heart 
beats under the robes. I consider that practically a victory. 
V. THE FINAL CHAPTER: BEAM ME BACK 
Will I survive straddling the gap between practice and the acad-
emy? I hope so. In order for me to navigate between the two closely 
aligned planets, we must ensure the survival of both our species. First, 
we should recognize that there is a conjunction between what we do 
substantively and pedagogically in our law schools and what happens 
on Planet Practice. Then we should trust the market. With so many 
law schools, a few can specialize in abstraction, and all can be more 
charitable to the "outsiders." If a school goes stark raving Crit (or law 
and ... ), its reputation as a theory-only school will spread, and if the 
canonists are right, its graduates will starve because they cannot prac-
tice law, write briefs, or talk to clients except in riddles. Enrollment 
will plummet and that school will close. We will be well rid of the 
place. If they are right. 
As for scholarship, I would add to Judge Edwards' prescription 
69. HERMAN MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD, SAILOR (1924). 
70. GLORIA NAYLOR, The Two, in THE WOMEN OF BREWSTER PLACE, 129 (1983). "The 
Two" tells a passionate story of two black lesbians who live in a quiet working class black com· 
munity whose denizens do not accept their being "that way." The story culminates in a parox-
ysm of terror and violence that opens issues of prejudice and tolerance, victims and victimizers, 
culpability and the lack thereof. 
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this notion of "practical" scholarship: it deepens one's understanding, 
makes us understand and care about other human experiences, en-
hances a sense of community, transports us out of the workaday, or 
makes us go "hmmm .... " Law school curricula should- no, must 
- include not only abstract and even radical theory, but cinema and 
fiction and philosophy and music. Journals should continue to publish 
articles about theory - even "wholly divorced from" cases if neces-
sary - although theory rarely is now, and will hardly be. Law 
schools should examine current teaching methods that reinforce val-
ues that later lead to unethical conduct, both my and Edwards' kind. 
They must encourage faculty to experiment with pedagogies that in-
volve all students in the learning experience. Faculty should teach 
with problems, ask hard questions, tell stories, hear stories, have par-
ties, and take field trips. 
If we open law schools to fresh influence, students will find passion 
and passionate scholars and teachers who respect the richness of ideas 
and difference. If we continue to fight it, the toxic "-isms" will kill us 
off long before marauding gangs of "Crits" and "laws ands" theorize 
us into submission. 
